STACKING THE DECK: FUTILITY AND THE
EXHAUSTION PROVISION OF THE
PRISON LITIGATION REFORM ACT
EUGENE NOV1KOVt
INTRODUCTION

Speaking before the Senate chamber in 1995, Bob Dole rose in
support of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). Promising that
the legislation would "help put an end to the inmate litigation funand-games," Senator Dole lamented that "[f] rivolous lawsuits filed by
prisoners tie up the courts, waste valuable legal resources, and affect
the quality ofjustice enjoyed by law-abiding citizens."' Senator Orrin
Hatch expressed his outrage that "[j]ailhouse lawyers with little better
to do are tying our courts in knots with the endless flow of frivolous
litigation." 2 Senator Harry Reid openly mocked the system, which
permitted prisoners to maintain frivolous litigation with the state and
provided them not only "an up-to-date library and a legal assistant,"
but also "three square meals a day" and the ability to "watch cable TV
in the rec room or lift weights in a nice modern gym" if they "get tired
of legal research." 3 Much was made of the infamous "peanut butter
lawsuit," in which an inmate sued after being served chunky peanut
butter instead of smooth, though it was only seventh on the list of
"Top 10 Frivolous Inmate Lawsuits Nationally" that was read into the
record.4
By 2000, prisoner civil rights suits had decreased by 39% from
their 1995 number.3 It is unclear how many of the lawsuits blocked by
tJ.D. Candidate, 2008, University of Pennsylvania Law School. I am indebted to
Professors Seth Kreimer and Catherine Struve for their invaluable suggestions, but all
mistakes are my own.
1 141 CONG. REc. 814,611, 14,626 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Dole).

Id. (statement of Sen. Hatch).
3 Id. at S14,627 (statement of Sen. Reid).
4 Id. at S14,629 (statement of Sen. Kyl). Topping the list was a suit by
a death row
inmate whose Game Boy was confiscated by prison officials. Id.
5 John Scalia, PrisonerPetitions Filed in U.S. District Courts, 2000, with Trends
19802000, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS: SPECIAL REPORT (Bureau of Justice Statistics,
U.S. Dep't of Justice, Wash. D.C.), Jan. 2002, at 1, available at http://
2
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the PLRA were in fact the sort of "frivolous" litigation that had so appalled the Senate,6 but certainly insofar as the Act was intended to reduce the burden on court systems caused by inmate litigation, it has
been successful.
As one might expect, however, some portions of the PLRA inevitably had collateral consequences. This Comment addresses one such
possible unintended result: the flexibility afforded prisons and prison
officials by the PLRA's exhaustion provision, which mandates that
prisoners exhaust all of their administrative remedies, including internal prison grievance processes, before they may file suit in federal
court.7 With no protective mechanism in place, this provision would
seem to give prisons free rein to stack the deck against inmates by resorting to any of the innumerable ways to stymie prisoners' efforts to
navigate the administrative processes. This problem is compounded
by recent court decisions suggesting, or outright asserting, that the
exhaustion provision leaves no room for the judicially created doctrine of futility, which ordinarily gives courts the power to excuse
ex•
8
haustion if they deem it futile or the administrative remedies inadequate.
This Comment argues that these cases should be narrowly interpreted as eliminating a procedural loophole rather than precluding
all judicial futility analysis. It also proposes alternative methods by
which courts can apply the sort of scrutiny necessary to protect good
faith litigants from abuse without running afoul of the PLRA. First,
however, it will be useful to take a brief detour to look at the back-

www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ppfusdOO.pdf. For a more detailed analysis of the
PLRA's effects, see Kermit Roosevelt III, Exhaustion Under the Prison Litigation Reform
Act: The Consequence of ProceduralError,52 EMORY LJ. 1771, 1779-80 (2003), and Margo
Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV.L. REv. 1555, 1585 (2003).
6 See Roosevelt, supra note 5, at 1779 & n.53 (suggesting that though
"[o]ne might
expect" that the suits deterred by the PLRA were frivolous, "[t] here is no way of [actually] knowing" whether they were).
The PLRA's exhaustion provision reads in its entirety, "No action shall be
brought with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until
such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)
(2000).
8 See, e.g.,
Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001) (requiring inmates to bring
cases to administrative courts, even if those courts are incapable of providing the remedy sought); Higginbottom v. Carter, 223 F.3d 1259, 1261 (11th Cir. 2000) ("[T]he
exhaustion requirement cannot be waived based upon the prisoner's belief that pursuing administrative procedures would be futile."); Alexander v. Hawk, 159 F.3d 1321,
1328 (1 1th Cir. 1998) ("The judicially created futility and inadequacy doctrines do not
survive the PLRA's mandatory exhaustion requirement."). An examination of these
cases and their holdings follows in Part III.
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ground of the PLRA and compare it to its predecessor statute, as well
as to give an overview of the futility doctrine in the exhaustion context.
I. PLRA BACKGROUND

Comprehensive accounts of the PLRA's passage are available elsewhere, 9 and I will not undertake another here. I will instead focus on
the changes in the relevant statutory provision in an effort to set the
stage for the arguments that follow.
Prior to the passage of the PLRA, the procedural aspects of inmate lawsuits in federal courts were governed by the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA), subtitled "[a] n Act [t]o authorize
actions for redress in cases involving deprivations of rights of institutionalized persons secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of
the United States."1 ° As the subtitle hints and the text proves, CRIPA
was quite a different animal than the PLRA. Spurred by an effort to
address widespread violations of the constitutional rights of confined
persons,' CRIPA was intended to open the doors of the federal courts
wider. This liberal aim is seen in its version of the exhaustion provision, which stands in stark contrast to the comparatively absolute language of the parallel provision in the PLRA, § 1997e(a).
CRIPA allowed a court to stay a prisoner action for up to 90 (and later 180)
days so that the prisoner could exhaust "such plain, speedy, and effective administrative remedies as are available" if the court "believe[d]
that such a requirement would be appropriate and in the interests of
justice. '' Furthermore, a court could not require exhaustion unless
the remedies were determined by the Attorney General or the court
to be "in substantial compliance with the minimum acceptable standards promulgated" elsewhere in CRIPA.14 Those standards contemplated, among other things, an advisory role for inmates in the formulation and implementation of the grievance processes, time limits for

9 See, e.g., Roosevelt, supra note 5, at
1776-80.
10 Pub. L. No. 96-247, 94 Stat. 349, 349 (1980).
It See Lynn S. Branham, The Prison Litigation
Reform Act's Enigmatic Exhaustion Requirement: What It Means and What Congress, Courts and CorrectionalOfficials Can Learn
From It, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 483, 493-94 (2001) (describing the impetus for enacting
CRIPA).
12 See42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)
(2000).
13 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)(1)
(1994), amended &yPrison Litigation Reform Act of

1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, § 803(d), 110 Stat. 1321-66, 1321-70 to 1321-73 (1996).
14 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)(2) (1994), amended by Prison Litigation Reform
Act of
1995 § 803(d).
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replies to grievances, priority processing of emergency grievances, and
independent review of grievance dispositions.5 Thus, not only was
the CRIPA exhaustion requirement left to the discretion of courts to
apply or not as dictated by "the interests of justice," but procedural
safeguards to protect against the deck-stacking problem were actually
built into the statute. 16
As I suggested in the Introduction, the PLRA passed amid an uproar over a supposed glut of frivolous lawsuits clogging the federal
court system.17 Its exhaustion provision addresses the perceived problem by simply eliminating CRIPA exhaustion's discretionary aspect, as
well as the statutory safeguards to be administered by the courts and
the Attorney General.18 Furthermore, the PLRA eliminated the defined exhaustion period, effectively permitting prison officials an
unlimited amount of time to process grievances under the administrative procedures they themselves establish.' 9 All that the current version of the20 statute requires is that the administrative remedies be
"available."
II.

OVERVIEW OF THE FUTILITY DOCTRINE

The exhaustion requirement is not unique to the prison litigation
context. In fact, courts have long enforced a general rule that
"[w] here relief is available from an administrative agency, the plaintiff
is ordinarily required to pursue that avenue of redress before proceeding to the courts; and until that recourse is exhausted, suit is
15 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(b) (2) (1994), amended by Prison Litigation
Reform Act of
1995 § 803(d).
16 Congress did amend CRIPA in 1994 to somewhat loosen these safeguards. See

Branham, supra note 11, at 496. However, though the safeguards were more easily satisfied, they remained in place.
17 See Brian J. Ostrom et al.,
Congress, Courts and Corrections: An EmpiricalPerspective
on the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 78 NOTRE DAME L.REv. 1525, 1525-26 (2003) (arguing that the volume,growth, and predominantly losing outcome of prisoner suits were
the three factors underlying the passage of the PLRA). Itisworth noting, however,
that there is some evidence to suggest that the increase in at least the number of lawsuits was due to the rising inmate population rather than the increasing litigiousness of
prisoners: the filing rate in 1996 was actually below the 1980 figure. John Scalia, Prisoner Petitions inthe Federal Courts, 1980-96 (Bureau ofJustice Statistics, U.S. Dep't ofJustice), Oct. 1997, at 1, availableat http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ppfc96.pdf.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2000).
19 Id.; see also Branham, supra note 11,
at 497 ("Now, there is no defined period of
time in which correctional officials must process a grievance to avoid court adjudication of the claim.").
20 See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2000); Branham, supra note 11, at 498.
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premature and must be dismissed. ' ] The application of this requirement has in some cases hinged on the administrative agency's
jurisdiction or authority to grant the particular type of relief sought.2
Furthermore, because of the federal courts' "virtually unflagging obligation to exercise the jurisdiction given them," in the absence of a
statute decreeing otherwise, the courts would "balance the interest of
the individual in retaining prompt access to a federal judicial forum,
against countervailing institutional interests favoring exhaustion. 23
In short, the judicially created version of the exhaustion requirement
in many ways parallels the scheme under CRIPA.24
Courts have superimposed a series ofjudicially created exceptions
onto this version of the exhaustion doctrine. 25 This set of exceptions
is framed most generally as excusing litigants from having to exhaust
available remedies when the court deems those remedies to be "inadequate."2 6 In McCarthy v. Madigan, the Supreme Court outlined
three "broad sets of circumstances" under which an inadequacy determination is warranted.27 One exists when requiring exhaustion
would prejudice a subsequent court action-if, for example, the timeframe for the administrative proceedings is so long that exhaustion
would effectively bar the suit on statute of limitations grounds. 2s A
second exists when there are indications that the agency is not em-

Reiter v. Cooper, 507 U.S. 258, 269 (1993).
See id. ("[The exhaustion] doctrine is inapplicable'to petitioners' reparations
claims, however, because the [agency] has long interpreted its statute as giving it no
21
22

power to decree reparations relief.").

McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 146 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted), superseded by statute, Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134,
§ 803(d), 110 Stat. 1321-66, 1321-70 to 1321-73 (1996), as recognized in Booth v.
Churner, 532 U.S. 740 (2001).
24 I use the term "parallels" because exhaustion of state administrative
remedies is
otherwise not required, as a matter of judge-made law, in § 1983 actions. See Patsy v.
Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 516 (1982).
25 It is possible to view this part of the doctrine as simply part of
the balancing "of
the interest of the individual.., against countervailing institutional interests" as described in McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 146, rather than a set of per se exceptions. See id.
("This Court's precedents have recognized at least three broad sets of circumstances in
which the interests of the individual weigh heavily against requiring administrative exhaustion."). Given the nature of the exhaustion requirement, however, and the concreteness and consistency of the concerns that have prompted courts to excuse litigants from fulfilling it, it seems to me that using the term "exceptions" to describe
these "broad sets of circumstances" is appropriate.
26 Id. at 146-49.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 146-47 (citing Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 575 n.14 (1973)).
23
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powered to grant effective relief,29 perhaps because it "lacks institutional competence to resolve the type of issue presented," ° because
the challenge is to the adequacy of the very administrative proceeding
at issue,2 ' or because the agency does not have the authority to grant
32
the type of relief requested. Finally, exhaustion is excused when it is
determined that the agency in question was biased or otherwise unable to give the plaintiff a fair hearing.3 In connection with this, the
Court in McCarthy cited a Fifth Circuit decision for the proposition
that "administrative procedures must 'not be used to harass or otherwise discourage those with legitimate claims. 4
Taken together, these exceptions clearly signify a solicitude for
the notion that litigants should not be forced to waste their time exhausting administrative remedies when it would be manifestly futile to
do so. The "bias" exception, in particular, if applied in the PLRA context, would help eliminate the "deck-stacking" concern-courts could
at least inquire into the procedures set up by the prison to determine
if they are unduly labyrinthine or unfair. For better or worse, however, the Supreme Court has cautioned that thejudiciary's freedom to
craft such a futility doctrine may be severely limited when Congress
has something else in mind-in particular, "[w] here Congress specifically mandates, exhaustion is required."3 6 The impact of the PLRA, as
we will soon see, seems to have been precisely that.

29 Id. at 147.

Id. at 147-48 (citing Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,
497 n.5
(1977)).
31 Id. at 148 (citing Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S.
55, 63 n.10 (1979)).
32 Id. (citing McNeese v. Bd. of Educ. for Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. 187,
373 U.S. 668,
675 (1963)). This is the issue dealt with in the PLRA context by Booth v. Churner, 532
U.S. 731 (2001), addressed in Part III.A. For an example of a pre-PLRA application of
this exception to an inmate suit, see Marsh v. Jones, 53 F.3d 707, 711-12 (5th Cir.
1995).
33 McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 148 (citing Gibson, 411 U.S.
at 575 n.14 (1973)).
Id. at 148-49 (citing Patsy v. Fla. Int'l Univ., 634 F.2d 900,912-13 (5th Cir.
1981),
rev'd on other grounds sub noni. Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982)).
35 Indeed, prior to the PLRA, there were indications
that such an inquiry was necessary in the § 1983 context, not merely to ensure an evenhanded application of the
exhaustion requirement, but "[i]n view of the importance of the rights protected by"
§ 1983. Patsy, 634 F.2d at 912.
McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 144.
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III. JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO FUTILITY AFTER THE PLRA

A. Booth v. Churner
By all accounts, the passage of the PLRA, amending § 1997e to
impose a seemingly absolute exhaustion requirement, has wreaked
havoc on the exhaustion doctrine as it existed under CRIPA and in
the case law in general. The most authoritative account of this effect
came from the Supreme Court in its 2001 Booth v. Churner decision3 7
That case did not concern exhaustion or futility in general, but rather
addressed a narrower issue: whether an inmate plaintiff seeking
monetary relief under § 1983 was required to exhaust his administrative remedies under the PLRA even though the available remedies did
not provide for monetary relief. 31 In other words, did the McCarthy
exception, which permitted excusal if the administrative agency did
not have the power to grant the relief requested, survive the PLRA's
amendment of the exhaustion statute?
The Court unanimously held that it did not. 39 Justice Souter's
opinion focused on the meaning of the term "available,, 4° which, as
noted previously, seems to be the only portion of § 1997e that leaves
judicial wiggle room-the plaintiff had argued that the administrative
remedial scheme was not "available" when the process could not result
in the specific remedial action that he sought. 41 Though acknowledging the "intuitive appeal" of this position,42 the Court interpreted
"available" to refer to the administrative processes available, not to the
forms of relief, and found that Congress intended "to require procedural exhaustion regardless of the fit between a prisoner's prayer for
relief and the administrative remedies possible." 43 In doing so, the
Court put to rest the question of whether this particular McCarthy exception remained in force after the PLRA: after Booth, prisoners must
exhaust administrative remedies regardless of whether they can possibly obtain the result they would seek in a federal lawsuit.
532 U.S. 731 (2001).
Id. at 734.
39 Id. This holding overruled several circuit court decisions
to the contrary, which
are discussed in Part IV.B.
40 532 U.S. at 736.
41 See id. at 736-37 ("Booth argues that when
the prison's process simply cannot
satisfy the inmate's sole demand, the odds of keeping the matter out of court are
slim.").
42 Id. at 736.
43 Id. at 739.
37
38
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This holding, on its own, is not so disturbing. There is nothing
inherently problematic about having the prison administrative process
address prisoners' complaints first: as the Supreme Court noted in
Booth, it is possible that being heard at the administrative level would
mollify even some inmates who would otherwise only be seeking damages, and that the process would "filter out some frivolous claims and
foster better-prepared litigation once a dispute did move to the courtroom."'A But there are several roughly contemporaneous lower court
cases that, while reaching conclusions along the same lines as Booth,
seem to have broader and therefore more disturbing holdings-it is
those cases that create the problems to which I have alluded.
B. Alexander v. Hawk and Progeny
One such case, Alexander v. Hawk,45 was decided by the Eleventh
Circuit some three years before the Supreme Court decided Booth.
The Alexander court purported to address the same relatively narrow
question that Booth ultimately decided (i.e., must a prisoner exhaust
administrative remedies if he seeks only monetary relief and can't possibly get it from the administrative process?) but nonetheless framed
its answer in sweeping language that seems to go far beyond "yes" or
"no." Drawing a sharp line between exhaustion "mandated by statute"
and exhaustion "imposed as a matter of judicial discretion," the Alexander court declared that "the judicially recognized futility and inadequacy exceptions do not survive the new mandatory exhaustion requirement of the PLRA." 46 Further, Alexander put forth an even more
expansive version of the Supreme Court's argument in Booth regarding the meaning of the term "available" in § 1997e.47 Because Congress removed the "plain, speedy, and effective" language that qualified "available" in the pre-PLRA version of the exhaustion provision,
the court reasoned, it "no longer wanted courts to examine the effectiveness of administrative remedies[,] but rather to focus solely on
whether an administrative remedy program is 'available' in the prison
involved., 48 Doing so would not involve an inadequacy inquiry;
rather, "the term 'available' ... is used to acknowledge that not all

44 Id. at 737.
45 159 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir. 1998).
46 Id. at 1326.
47 See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
48 Alexander, 159 F.3d at 1326.
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prisons actually have administrative remedy programs." 49 The Eleventh Circuit ultimately limited its holding to the same precise issue
later resolved in Booth,5° but its reasoning seemed to flatly deny the
possibility of any of the residual McCarthyexceptions.
The Eleventh Circuit then cited Alexander two years later in Higginbottom v. Carter, a case suggesting that exhaustion may not be excused even if the prison administrative process considers the pris5
' Though the court did
oner's particular complaints "not• grievable."
52
not explicitly make such a holding, it did not seem concerned in the
least that the prison could conceivably refuse to hear certain claims in
its grievance process. Instead, the court relied on Alexander to emphasize that "the exhaustion requirement cannot be waived based upon
the prisoner's beliefs that pursuing administrative procedures would
be futile." 53 The court's per curiam opinion devoted less than two
pages to disposing of the plaintiffs claims.
These sorts of cases were not confined to the Eleventh Circuit.
The same year that Higginbottom came down, the Sixth Circuit decided
Jones v. Smith, in which the inmate plaintiff claimed that he should be
able to proceed with his suit under the Americans with Disabilities
Act, despite not having exhausted administrative remedies, because
his grievance counselor refused to provide him with a grievance form
54
so that he could begin the process.
Taking a similar approach to
Higginbottom, the Court did not explicitly hold that exhaustion is not
satisfied if the prison simply refuses to permit the inmate to file a
grievance, but instead rested its disposition of the case on the notion
that the plaintiff did•55
not make a sufficient showing that he fulfilled
the PLRA's requirements.

49

50
51

Id.
Id. at 1328.

Higginbottom v. Carter, 223 F.3d 1259, 1261 (llth Cir. 2000) (per curiam).
The case also reaffirmed Alexander's holding that exhaustion is required even if the
plaintiff seeks relief not available from the administrative process. Id.
52 It noted instead that the plaintiff "offer[ed] no arguments supporting
his assertion that his claims were 'not grievable."' Id.
53 Id.
54 266 F.3d 399,400 (6th Cir.
2001).
55 See id. ('Jones failed to demonstrate that he had exhausted his administrative
remedies .... admitting that no grievance had been filed because his counselor did not
give him a grievance form.... He does not allege that there was no other source for
obtaining a grievance form or that he made any other attempt to obtain a form...
(citation omitted)).
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On one hand, this decision seems heartening: the Jones court implied that the prisoner could conceivably bypass the exhaustion requirement by making a showing of unacceptable administrative process shenanigans on the part of the prison, presumably by proving that
there was no other way to file a grievance. On the other hand, however, the court seems to have limited this possibility to cases of absolute stonewalling, leaving prisons free to erect procedural obstacles to
stymie inmates' efforts to sue in federal court.
There is, in any event, no standard, and no clear guidelines exist
for inmates with legitimate claims-though the pre-PLRA futility doctrine was highly discretionary, with the determination in any individual case left up to the trial judge, at the very least plaintiffs knew what
arguments they could present ' Though cases like Jones contain
vague intimations of the sort of showing that will suffice to excuse exhaustion, they mostly leave inmate plaintiffs at sea.
C. Hemphill v. New York
There is, however, a hint of a light at the end of the tunnel. Some
courts, seemingly accepting the obviation of judicial futility and inadequacy doctrines by the PLRA, have taken a different approach to
providing procedural safeguards in applying the exhaustion requirement. In Hemphill v. New York, the Second Circuit, in an opinion by
of the
Judge Calabresi, held that in some circumstances, "the behavior
57
defendants may render administrative remedies unavailable."
The district court in Hemphill had dismissed the inmate's suit on
nonexhaustion grounds; 5 the circuit court vacated and remanded. 59
In doing so, the court set forth a three-part inquiry for judges to undertake in considering prison officials' nonexhaustion defenses. They
must first ask whether the asserted administrative remedies were in
fact available to the prisoner within the meaning of the statute. The
court was less than forthcoming in clarifying the doctrinal intricacies
of this prong, suggesting that remedies may not be "available" to begin with, may be "nominally available [but] not so in fact," or may be
made unavailable by threats6°-with the result that either "the PLRA's

56
57
5

See supra Part 1I.
380 F.3d 680, 686 (2d Cir. 2004).
Id. at 681-82.

59

Id. at 691.

60

Id. at 686-87.
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exhaustion requirement is inapplicable" or "all available remedies
[may be deemed] exhausted." 6 '
Second, courts must consider "whether the defendants may have
forfeited the affirmative defense of non-exhaustion by failing to raise
or preserve it."62 This is an estoppel argument that has its Second Cir63
cuit origins in Ziemba v. Wezner, decided mere months before Hemphill. There, the court found that the district court "erroneously did
not address [the plaintiffs] claim that [the] defendants' actions may
have estopped the State from asserting the exhaustion defense.""
Hemphill makes it clear that this argument contemplates threats by defendant prison officials made to intimidate a plaintiff into abandoning
her grievance,65 and also that the estoppel inquiry is to be made as to
each individual defendant.6 6 This makes it unlikely that plaintiffs
could use estoppel to defeat a nonexhaustion defense in a case of a
prison erecting structural obstacles rather than using intimidation tactics.
Finally, and perhaps most intriguingly, the court held that "there
are certain 'special circumstances' in which, though administrative
remedies may have been available and though the government may
not have been estopped from asserting the affirmative defense of nonexhaustion, the prisoner's failure to comply with administrative procedural requirements may nevertheless have been justified."67 One
such special circumstance the court contemplated is when a plaintiffs

Id. at 686. Although this may seem like a doctrinal point too subtle to be relevant, the distinction may be crucial given some of the arguments made in Alexander v.
Hawk and its companion cases. See infra Part V (explaining this distinction in more
detail).
62 Hemphill, 380 F.3d
at 686.
63 See 366 F.3d 161, 163 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that "the affirmative defense of
61

exhaustion is subject to estoppel").
CA Id. at 163; see also Wright v. Hollingsworth, 260 F.3d
357, 358 n.2 (5th Cir. 2001)
("The 42 U.S.C. § 1997e exhaustion requirement is not jurisdictional and may be subject to certain defenses such as waiver, estoppel or equitable tolling."). Wright should
be distinguished from the broader Hemphill and Ziemba holdings, however, as the
Wright court was sure to emphasize that "[n]othing in the Prison Litigation Reform
Act... prescribes appropriate grievance procedures or enables judges, by creative interpretation of the exhaustion doctrine, to prescribe or oversee prison grievance systems." Id. at 358 (footnote omitted).
6 See Hemphill, 380 F.3d at 688-89 ("Hemphill
contends that ... [the prison
guard's] threats should estop the defendants from presenting an affirmative defense of
non-exhaustion.").
ra;
See id. at 689 ("[D]epending on the facts pertaining to each defendant, it is possible that some individual defendants may be estopped, while others may not be.").
G7 Id. (quoting Giano v. Goord, 380 F.3d 670, 676 (2d
Cir. 2004)). The opinion in
Gianowas handed down on the same day as HemphilL
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attempt to exhaust her administrative remedies "reflected a reasonable interpretation" of prison regulations, even if this interpretation is
ultimately deemed erroneous or lacking. 68 The court also left the
door open for consideration of otherjustifications for nonexhaustion,
including-presumably as a counterpart to the estoppel argumentthreats from prison officials. 69
In a similar vein, a case from the Eastern District of Wisconsin,
Davis v. Milwaukee County, held that failure to provide necessary legal
materials amounts to interference with a prisoner's ability to exhaust
his administrative remedies, and thus interference with his right of access to the courts. 7 The case was a suit for the denial of that right,
and the court's ruling did not directly impact the fate of the plaintiff's
previous suit that was dismissed for failure to exhaust-he was simply
awarded nominal damages." However, this recognition of an "interference" concern may provide a useful mode of analysis for evaluating
the merits of a defendant prison's nonexhaustion defense.
Neither Hemphill nor Davis explicitly deals with the futility doctrine; neither court comes out and claims that it is considering the
"adequacy" of the remedies that are available, even though Hemphill
does suggest that it is doing so, if obliquely. 72 This, however, is precisely the point: as I discuss below, these cases and the doctrines that
emerge from them may serve as a substitute for the judicially created
futility exception if courts continue to deem the latter abrogated by
the PLRA. Whether the PLRA actually justifies such an abrogation is
the subject of the next section.

68 Id.
9

Id. at 688.

70 See

Davis v. Milwaukee County, 225 F. Supp. 2d 967, 975-76 (E.D. Wis. 2002)
("[11f prison officials prevent an inmate from exhausting they impede his access to the
courts....").
71 Id. at
980.
72 See Hemphill, 380 U.S. at 686 ("To the extent that the plaintiff
lacked 'available'
administrative remedies, the PLRA's exhaustion requirement is inapplicable.").
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IV. DOES THE PLRAJusTIFY ABROGATION OF THE
FUTILITY EXCEPTION?

A. PracticalConcerns
As a starting point, it is important to clearly distinguish among the
various holdings discussed in Part III, as well as the questions involved.
It is hard to quarrel with the basic holding of Booth v. Churner-that
Congress intended to require administrative exhaustion even if such
exhaustion could not actually provide the relief the inmate would seek
in federal court.' 73 However, though this eminently reasonable conclusion does rule out application of one aspect of one prong of the
McCarthy inquiry,74 it by no means requires the obviation of the entire
doctrine. Accepting Booth, which can be viewed as merely closing a
procedural loophole not consonant with congressional intent, does
not necessary entail the acceptance of Alexander and its companion
cases, 7 ' which, as discussed above, argue that the PLRA was intended
to eliminate judicial consideration of futility and inadequacy altogether. Specifically, once the broad proclamations made in Alexander
(arguably in dicta) go beyond the procedural issue in question there
and in Booth, and into substantive obstacles to fruitful grievances, as
the opinions in Higginbottom76 and Jones77 threaten to do, there is at
least a potential problem.
These concerns are compounded by the Seventh Circuit's prob78
lematic Pozo v. McCaughtry decision, the troubling implications of
which were explored in detail by Professor Kermit Roosevelt in his article, Exhaustion Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act: The Consequence
78
of ProceduralError.
In Pozo, the court held that a prisoner has not ex-

73 Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 734
(2001).
74 See McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140,
147-48 (1992) ("[A]n administrative
remedy may be inadequate 'because of some doubt as to whether the agency was empowered to grant effective relief,"' including cases in which the administrative agency
"lack[s] authority to grant the type of relief requested." (quoting Gibson v. Berryhill,
411 U.S. 564, 575 n.14 (1973))), superseded by statute, Prison Litigation Reform Act of
1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, § 803(d), 110 Stat. 1321-66, 1321-70 to 1321-73 (1996), as
recognized in Booth, 532 U.S. 740.
75 Note that Booth seems to cite Alexander approvingly, at least with respect
to its
narrow holding. See Booth, 532 U.S. at 735 (affirming the judgment of the Third Circuit, which reached the same conclusion as the Alexander court).
76 See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text (discussing
the import of Higginbottom).
77 See supranotes 54-55 and accompanying text (explaining the significance
ofJones).
78 286 F.3d 1022 (7th
Cir. 2002).
79 See Roosevelt, supra note 5, at 1782-88 (criticizing
the Pozo decision).
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hausted her administrative remedies under § 1997e(a) unless she has
complied with the procedural rules established by the prison.8 0
Though this seems reasonable, and even commonsensical, the result is
that a late grievance filing or appeal, or a similar error by an inmate,
will lead to the dismissal of any federal lawsuit that arises out of the
complaint,8' a conclusion later reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in
Woodford v. Ngo.
Such a scheme creates a clear incentive for states
and prisons to structure their administrative processes in such a way as
to increase the chance that inmate complaints will terminate in procedural default; one can imagine countless subtle and not-so-subtle
ways to accomplish this end. 83 The problem may be further exacerbated by the Supreme Court's recent explicit pronouncement that
to properly exhaust administrative remedies[,] prisoners must "complete
the administrative review process in accordance with the applicable procedural rules"-rules that are defined not by the PLRA, but by the
prison grievance process itself. ... [I]t is the prison's requirements, and
not the PLRA, that define the boundaries of proper exhaustion.84

There can no longer be any doubt that the exhaustion ball is fully
in the prisons' court.

80

See Pozo, 286 F.3d at 1023 ("[Ulnless the prisoner completes the administrative

process by following the rules the state has established for that process, exhaustion has
not occurred.").
81 See id. at 1025 (dismissing the plaintiffs federal complaint
because he failed to
file a timely appeal within the state system); Roosevelt, supra note 5, at 1783 ("[Pozo's]
ultimate conclusion is that an attempt at exhaustion rejected on nonmerits grounds is
no exhaustion at all, and that inmates who have erred at some step in a prison grievance process should have their suits dismissed for failure to exhaust."). Professor Roosevelt also mentions, in a footnote, that the result in Pozo is all the harsher for the fact
that PLRA exhaustion does not incorporate (at least some of) the traditional exceptions to exhaustion doctrine. Id. at 1783 n.74.
82 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2384 (2006).
83 It is not necessary to ascribe malicious motives to prison officials to believe this
to be the case. Administrative officials often have discretion with respect to whether or
not to hear untimely appeals. See, e.g.,
Wis. ADMIN. CODE DOC § 310.13(2) (2006)
("Upon good cause, the [corrections complaint examiner] may accept for review an
appeal filed later than 10 calendar days after receipt of the decision."). It is easy to
imagine simple economics influencing the "good cause" determination when the possibility of a federal lawsuit looms.
84 Jones v. Bock, 127 S. Ct. 910, 922-23 (2007) (quoting Woodford, 126
S. Ct. at
2384).
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B. CongressionalIntent
All of this is to say that myriad practical problems accompany the
sort of abandonment ofjudicial discretion in applying the exhaustion
requirement suggested by Alexander. Despite the rhetoric quoted at
the beginning of this Comment, it is far from clear that Congress intended these manifestly unfair results when it passed the PLRA, and
one may be inclined to give Congress the benefit of the doubt. It
should be noted, moreover, that even the statutory interpretation case
for abrogating judicial futility analysis is not open and shut, though it
now boasts the support of circuit court and, to a lesser extent, Supreme Court precedent. In fact, before Booth, several decisions interpreted the PLRA to retain even the type-of-relief-requested prong of
McCarthy. The Tenth Circuit, for example, had held in Garrettv. Hawk
that, at least in the context of a Bivens action,85 an inmate need not
exhaust remedies that could not provide relief against the specific defendants and were not designated as prerequisites to a Bivens claim;
the court determined that there were no adequate remedies to be exhausted. s6 An even stronger pre-Booth statement came from the Fifth
Circuit in Whitley v. Hunt, which declared that "'the import of
McCarthy is clear: A district court should not require exhaustion under section 1997e if the prisoner seeks only monetary damages and
the prison grievance system does not afford such a remedy.' ... We
find nothing in the amended language of § 1997e that would undercut" that holding. 8 A similar holding also came from the Ninth Circuit. s
Furthermore, the strong language in Alexander notwithstanding, it
is far from clear that Congress actually intended to remove all judicial

85A claim for damages can be brought against the federal government
directly

under the Constitution. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971) (holding that a private person whose constitutional
fights were violated by federal agencies was entitled to money damages).
86 See Garrett v. Hawk, 127 F.3d 1263, 1266-67 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding
that an
inmate need not pursue Federal Tort Claims Act remedies as a prerequisite to filing a
Bivens suit), abrogatedby Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731 (2001).
87 Whitley v. Hunt, 158 F.3d 882, 887 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting Marsh v. Jones, 53
F.3d 707, 710 (5th Cir. 1995), abrogated by Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731 (2001)).
Marsh was a pre-PLRA decision applying McCarthy to the prison litigation context. See
supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text (noting that pre-PLRA, CRIPA permitted institutionalized persons whose fights were violated to bring actions).
88 See Lunsford v. Jumao-As, 155 F.3d 1178, 1179 (9th Cir. 1998) ("We agree
with
both parties that Lunsford was... not required to exhaust his administrative remedies
before filing this lawsuit in the district court in light of the fact that the Administrative
Remedy Program only provides for injunctive relief.").

832

UNIVERSITY OFPENNS YL VANIA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 156:817

discretion and eliminate all judicially created doctrine in the exhaustion arena-or, given the precedent, that courts should assume such
an intent. In other contexts, the Supreme Court has permitted longstanding, judicially created common law to survive absent an explicit
statement of Congress's intent to eliminate the same, even when statutory language seems to occupy the field. In Tenney v. Brandhove, for
example, the Court retained the venerable doctrine of legislative immunity,8 9 thus barring § 1983 suits against legislators in their legislative capacity despite statutory language indicating that the statute applies to "every person." 9 The Court asked whether Congress, "by the
general language" 9' of § 1983, meant to overturn the longstanding
common law tradition of legislative immunity,
and concluded (over a
92
dissent by Justice Douglas) that it did not.
Pierson v. Ray, decided sixteen years after Tenney, made essentially
the same argument in favor of retaining the common law immunity
for sitting judges acting in their judicial capacity.9 3 Interestingly, Justice Douglas, dissenting alone, made arguments that seem to be echoed in the Alexander opinion. Arguing from historical context, he
noted that § 1983 was passed during a "condition of lawlessness[ ,]..
under which people were being denied their civil rights," and stated
that "[t]o most, 'every person' would mean every person, not every person except judges. 9 4 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court rejected this interpretation and opted to retain the judicially recognized judicial immunity.

See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 379 (1951) ("We conclude.., that...
the individual defendants and the legislative committee were acting in a field where
legislators traditionally have power to act .... and that [§ 1983] does not create liability
for such conduct.").
90 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000)
(emphasis added).
91
Tenney, 341 U.S. at 376.
92 See id. at 379 (holding that "the statute of 1871 does
not create civil liability" for
legislative conduct).
93 See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-54 (1967) (noting that "[flew
doctrines
were more solidly established at common law than the immunity ofjudges from liability for damages for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction" and concluding
that the doctrine was not abolished by § 1983 despite the "every person" language because "[t]he legislative record gives no clear indication that Congress meant to abolish
wholesale all common-law immunities").
94 Id. at 559 (Douglas, J., dissenting); cf Alexander v. Hawk, 159 F.3d 1321,
132326 (11 th Cir. 1998) (noting the glut of prisoner suits at the time the PLRA was passed,
and arguing that "Congress now has mandated exhaustion" in § 1997e by amending it
to read that "no action shall be brought" absent exhaustion of all available remedies).
89
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Of course, the analogy is not perfect. Tenney and Pierson involved
myriad constitutional and separation of powers concerns that are simply not implicated in the PLRA context. 95 There was no previous version of § 1983 that the Court could have used to discern Congressional intent, whereas several colorable arguments in favor of
abrogation can be made by comparing the CRIPA exhaustion scheme
with the PLRA-amended § 1997e.96 It could also prove relevant that
the judicially created immunities at issue in Tenney and Pierson are arguably older and more entrenched than the McCarthy futility doc-

trine.97
As such, the above analysis is at best suggestive, but by no means
conclusive; similarly, the fact that certain ultimately overruled decisions do not accord with the current trend of obviating McCarthy is
hardly a decisive argument that the current trend is wrong. I do not
mean to suggest that Alexander is necessarily incorrect, but rather that
the question is close. Because the question is close, and because of
the disturbing practical implications of giving full force to Alexander's
language, discussed above, the better approach is to view the combination of Booth and Alexander as issuing narrow commands eliminating
the procedural loophole of crafting a complaint that prays for relief
not available via administrative proceedings. Indeed, in his Woodford
concurrence, Justice Breyer interpreted the PLRA to "implicitly incorporate []" the "traditional exception [s]" set out in McCarthy, among
other cases. 98 As I have attempted to show in Parts III and IV, reading
the decisions broadly to sweep away all judicial futility analysis in
PLRA exhaustion creates unacceptable deck-stacking concerns, with
the likely result that many deserving complaints will not get to court.

95 See, e.g.,
Tenney, 341 U.S. at 376 (questioning whether Congress could constitutionally abrogate legislative immunity and noting the importance of legislative investigations in representative government).
Indeed, this is precisely what Alexander purported to do. See supra note 94 (noting Alexanders holding that Congress intentionally mandated PLRA's exhaustion requirement).
97 See Tenney, 341 U.S. at 376 ("Did Congress by the
general language of its 1871
statute mean to overturn the tradition of legislative freedom achieved in England by
Civil War and carefully preserved in the formation of State and National Governments
here?").
98 Woodford v. Ngo, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2393 (2006) (Breyer, J., concurring).

834

UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYL VANIA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 156:817

V. POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES: CONSTRUCTIVE EXHAUSTION,
ESTOPPEL, AND DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE

Even if Alexander is embraced to its fullest extent, however, not all
is lost. Several of the cases described in Part III have begun to develop
alternative doctrines that can potentially provide some of the McCarthy
futility/inadequacy test's procedural safeguards. Because these safeguards are constrained to specific situations, these alternative doctrines offer less protection than the more general inquiry contemplated by McCarthy, but taken together and applied consistently, they
can begin to fill the gap.9
00
1
The first of these is the notion of "constructive exhaustion"
hinted at in Hemphill v. New York.'o' This would permit courts to substitute a determination that all "available" administrative remedies
have been exhausted for the determination that existing remedies are
inadequate. This seemingly semantic difference may appear particularly vulnerable to the criticism mentioned above °2-that it is a cynical attempt to slalom around restrictions Congress intended to put in
place-but it is important to remember that no one denies that the
term "available" in § 1997e(a) has some meaning. 0 3 Even accepting
the proposition in Alexander that Congress's deletion of "plain, speedy
and effective" from § 1997e(a) precludes judicial consideration of
whether administrative remedies are adequate, some point must be
reached at which the remedies that have putatively been established
are so inaccessible to the plaintiff as to be effectively unavailable, lead-

99 One can look at these suggestions as advocating a surreptitious evasion of congressional intent under the PLRA. However, each has its own independent justification, and none is without a basis in existing law.
100To my knowledge, this term has not been previously used in this context.
However, the idea exists elsewhere, including in statute. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (6) (C) (i)
(2000) ("Any person making a request to any agency for records.., shall be deemed
to have exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to such request if the
agency fails to comply with the applicable time limit provisions of this paragraph.").
1o1See Hemphill v. New York, 380 F.3d 680, 686 (2d Cir. 2004) (describing Abney v.
McGinnis, 380 F.3d 663 (2d Cir. 2004), where, after the plaintiff did not appeal a favorable outcome, "[b]y the time he discovered that the favorable decision was not being
implemented, the deadline for appealing the administrative ruling had come and
gone," and the court accordingly "held that all available administrative remedies had
been exhausted").
102See supra note 99.
103 See, e.g., Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 739 (2001)
("[The term 'available']
makes sense only in referring to the procedural means, not the particular relief ordered.").
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ing to the conclusion that all remedies that are available have been
exhausted, even if the number of remedies exhausted is in reality zero.
Such was the case, for example, in Abney v. McGinnis,1°4 cited by
Judge Calabresi in Hemphill. The Abney court held that where "prison
regulations do not provide a viable mechanism for appealing implementation failures, prisoners in [Plaintiffs] situation have fully exhausted their available remedies."' 0 The court distinguished between
the "special circumstances" analysis discussed above in Part II and the
determination that "administrative remedies are not actually 'available' under the PLRA,""'6 and then seemed to rely on both for its ultimate holding that those remedies that were available had been fully
exhausted despite the fact that the plaintiff did not pursue his grievance all the way through the process. 10 7 Furthermore, under the guise
of this analysis, the court effectively engaged in an inadequacy inquiry,
finding that the established procedures did not provide sufficient time
for inmates to assess whether an appeal was necessary, and were "impracticable," "burdensome," and "counterintuitive" as interpreted by
the state.'0 s Manifestly, then, the line of reasoning suggested by Hemp-

104

380 F.3d 663 (2d Cir. 2004).

105Id. at 669.
106Id. at 667.
107See id. at 669 ("A prisoner who has not received promised relief is not required

to file a new grievance where doing so may result in a never-ending cycle of exhaustion. Accordingly, we find that [the plaintiff] has sufficiently alleged full exhaustion of
all available administrative remedies.").
108 Id. at 668-69. A possible parallel here is
the "independent and adequate state
grounds" doctrine, which ordinarily prevents Supreme Court review of state court
judgments when they rest on state law grounds that are "independent of the federal
ground [s]and adequate to support thejudgment." Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S.
207, 210 (1935). This is so even when the state court dismissed a particular claim on
procedural grounds, because "failure to present a federal question in conformance
with state procedure constitutes an adequate and independent ground of decision barring review in [the Supreme] Court." Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 512 n.7 (1978).
Under some circumstances, however, a state procedural ground may not be considered "adequate"-if, for example, the procedural rule on which the state decision
rested is not "strictly or regularly followed." Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 587
(1988).
Similarly, "[niovelty in procedural requirements cannot be permitted to
thwart review in this Court applied for by those who, in justified reliance upon prior
decisions, seek vindication in state courts of their federal constitutional rights."
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 457-58 (1958). Hemphill and Abney
seem to point toward a similar analysis to determine whether prison administrative
remedies are "available." If federal constitutional rights are too important to be
thwarted by haphazardly applied state procedural law, a similar skepticism is surelyjustified toward decentralized prison administrative schemes.
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hill and implemented in Abney 109 has some oomph, and may in some
circumstances serve as well, or nearly as well, as an application of
McCarthy.
A second possibility is the estoppel argument discussed in Hemphill
and Ziemba. I have already discussed this aspect of those cases in some
detail,11 ° and will note only that this is a much more tightly circumscribed doctrine, and one unlikely to yield satisfactory results in nearly
as many cases as either McCarthy or the above modified availability
analysis. However, in cases where defendant officials see fit to intimidate grievants into abandoning their complaints, it will serve as a suitable safeguard.
A final alternative may provide a reprieve for frustrated plaintiffs
who make Eighth Amendment claims. To the dismay of some commentators,11' the Supreme Court in 2002 interpreted the PLRA exhaustion provision to apply to such Eighth Amendment lawsuits, even
when they involve specific incidents of excessive force. 112 Eighth
Amendment claims are evaluated under the "deliberate indifference"
standard, which states that a defendant violates the Eighth Amendment if he is subjectively aware that his actions present a substantial
risk of physical harm to the inmate. 113
This creates the possibility that when inmates sue for Eighth
Amendment violations and are unreasonably rebuffed during the
grievance process, this in itself could constitute deliberate indifference under current Eighth Amendment doctrine. This would be parRecall that Hemphill merely vacated the district court's judgment and remanded
the case. Hemphill v. New York, 380 F.3d 680, 691 (2d Cir. 2004). I chose to use
Hemphill instead of Abney in my initial discussion in Part III.C because the former contains a clearer statement of principles.
110 See supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text (suggesting that if individual
defendants fail to raise the issue of nonexhaustion, they may not use it later).
I See, e.g.,
Ann H. Matthews, Note, The Inapplicability of the Prison Litigation Reform
Act to PrisonerClaims of Excessive Force, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 536, 539 (2002) ("[T]he Court's
failure to interpret the PLRA's exhaustion requirements narrowly to exempt excessive
force claims from the mandatory exhaustion requirements constitutes an unnecessary
and inappropriate retreat from longstanding federal judicial recognition and protection of prisoners' rights.").
112 Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). The details are beyond the scope of
this Comment, but the question was whether excessive force suits were suits about
"prison conditions" within the meaning of the PLRA. Id. at 519-20.
113 See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828-29 (1994) (holding that the deliberate indifference standard requires a showing of subjective awareness). Excessive force
claims, however, require something more than indifference; a plaintiff must show that
the force was applied "maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing
harm." Id. at 835 (quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6 (1992)).
109
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ticularly true when inmates attempt to file grievances respecting ongoing conditions-of-confinement violations. The exhaustion inquiry
could then be subsumed into the Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference inquiry. Not only could this lead to a determination that no
remedies were "available" under the PLRA, but the defendants could
be held responsible for their conduct throughout the administrative
process. Deterrence of this sort of behavior could end up being a
positive externality.
Of course, a demonstration of deliberate indifference would not
be easy to make in this context. As mentioned above, the deliberate
indifference standard in prisoner cases is subjective rather than objective, meaning that a plaintiff must demonstrate actual knowledge and
indifference on the part of the prison official defendants, not mere
unreasonable ignorance.1 4 However, "stacking the deck," as I conceive of it, can include misconduct by individual officials as well as draconian grievance procedures. There is no reason why a particular implementation of prison grievance procedures by a particular official
cannot meet the deliberate indifference standard.
It remains to be seen how this argument will be handled by the
courts, or if it will even be made. It is clear, however, that even if
courts accept Alexander v. Hawk, they will still have options to ensure
fairness throughout the administrative process. Though they may give
up a more general doctrine of judicial discretion, they may be able to
replicate much of its effect using a combination of more precise tools.
CONCLUSION

The PLRA amendment to § 1997e(a) put courts in a precarious
position. Because courts seemed to agree that the new provision
served as an exhaustion mandate, the question became how many
barriers they would allow prisons and prison officials to erect between
inmate plaintiffs and federal courts. Plainly, given the context of the
PLRA's passage, Congress intended to erect some barriers. But some
courts have come dangerously close to giving prison defendants carte
blanche to keep prisoners out of court altogether. I have attempted
to show that this is a real threat and to present reasons to keep it from
coming to pass, as well as ways to accomplish that. I have argued that
the PLRA does not necessarily mandate wholesale abrogation of the
114

Id. at 841-42; see also Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35-36 (1993) (holding

that the deliberate indifference standard encompasses a subjective state-of-mind component).
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McCarthy v. Madigan futility doctrine, but even if courts conclude otherwise, alternative tools exist to ensure that prison officials cannot unreasonably keep legitimate civil rights claims from being heard.
As I discussed at the beginning of this piece, there are some indications that the PLRA has been effective in curbing the "inmate litigation fun-and-games." l1' However, as long as we are serious about giving legitimate civil rights claimants redress in the federal courts, even
if they are incarcerated, we must make sure that the solution does not
become worse than the problem. Section 1997e(a), the PLRA's exhaustion provision, has been, and will continue to be, an important
battleground in this conflict.

See supra note 1 and accompanying text.

